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INTRODUCTION
Secrecy regarding national security information is a widely accepted
phenomenon. As one observer noted:
[A] government must sometimes stringently control certain information
that (1) gives the nation a significant advantage over adversaries or
(2) prevents adversaries from having an advantage that could
significantly damage the nation .... In wartime, when a nation's survival
is at stake, the reasons for secrecy are most apparent, the secrecy
* Enoch N. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia School of
Law. Special thanks to James O'Reilly and William Anderson for their thoughtful




restrictions imposed by government are most widespread, and
acceptance of those restrictions by the citizens is broadest.
1
Throughout history, however, such secrecy has proved problematic.
Although officials often have credible and legitimate reasons to keep
national security information secret, government secrecy initiatives have
invariably expanded to encompass information beyond their initial
rationale.
Over time, we have come to realize the very real problems associated
with excessive government secrecy. In 1966, Congress enacted the
Freedom of Information Act 2 (FOIA) to ensure greater public access to
government information. Recognizing, however, that some secrecy is
necessary to protect national security, FOIA currently exempts from
disclosure "properly classified" information "specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or foreign policy" (hereinafter "the (b)(1) exemption").,
FOIA's reference to "properly classified" information was an attempt to
limit secrecy to information legitimately related to national security.
Nevertheless, the statute left intact the existing classification process--one
that many critics point to as a cause of excessive secrecy. This fact,
combined with judicial reluctance to question executive officials invocation
of the (b)(1) exemption, has rendered FOIA only marginally effective in
battling government withholding of information in the name of national
security.
Furthermore, reliance on the national security rationale has proved
irresistible to legislative and executive officials who use it to justify
withholding beyond FOIA's exemption for classified information. Recent
Bush Administration actions aptly exemplify this phenomenon.4 In
addition to relaxing classification criteria after the September 1 th terrorist
attacks,5 the Bush Administration encouraged officials to withhold
"sensitive but unclassified information," which arguably should be
disclosed under FOIA.6 The administration further lobbied heavily for the
1. Arvin S. Quist, Security Classifications of Information Vol. 1: Introduction,
History, and Adverse Impacts, Ch. 1 (2002), available at http://www/fas.org/sgp/library/
quist/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2004); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) ("Secrecy in respect of information gathered... may be
highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.").
2. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1).
4. All executive administrations have been subject to the creep of secrecy. I focus
primarily on the Bush Administration because of its currency, because secrecy has been an
integral aspect of its operations, and because many of its attempts at secrecy have been
formalized in law.
5. See Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003) (outlining the classification
standards, authority, categories, and duration by which information may be kept in
confidence by the government).
6. See Attorney General John Ashcroft, Memorandum for All Heads of Federal
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Homeland Security Act of 2002, which specifically exempts "critical
infrastructure information" from FOLA disclosure.7
While there may be legitimate national security interests associated with
shielding "sensitive but unclassified" and "critical infrastructure"
information from public disclosure, the Bush Administration's actions are
problematic. First, statutes and regulations provide no uniform definition
of "sensitive but unclassified" information, a term that initially was not
meant to apply to disclosure issues. 8  Combined with the Bush
Administration's invocation of the national security rationale, this may
cause excessive withholding of information. Second, the "critical
infrastructure" exemption from FOLA is overly broad, does not adequately
define the information to be withheld, and attaches criminal penalties to
disclosure, which also may lead to excessive withholding of information.
Secrecy with respect to national security is important, but the natural
tendency of bureaucrats to rely on it-understandably exacerbated in times
of crisis-threatens to engulf FOIA's purpose. Historically, secrecy has
continued well beyond identifiable crises, becoming entrenched in even
routine matters. The fact that government officials believe the country has
subsisted in a constantly threatened state for much of the last 50 years due
to the Cold War and terrorism 9 suggests that executive officials will
continue to invoke the national security rationale to justify even greater
withholding of government information.
To counteract the government's predictable creep toward excessive
secrecy, Congress should amend FOIA. Although there are many possible
avenues one could take, this Article suggests three broad categories of
changes. First, Congress should codify an exemption for national security
information in a single statute. Consolidation of national security
information within one exemption would supplant the current patchwork
approach and create an overarching, uniform framework to assess the
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (stating that the Department of Justice would support agencies'
decisions to withhold information under FOIA unless they lacked a sound legal basis); see
also Andrew H. Card, Jr., White House Chief of Staff, Memorandum for all Heads of
Federal Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/
bush/wh031902.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter Card Memorandum]
(discussing new disclosure guidelines for use when reviewing national security
information); Laura S. Kimberly, Acting Director of the Information Security Oversight
Office, Memorandum for Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/bush/wh031902.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004 ) [hereinafter
Kimberly Memorandum] (providing that officials should safeguard sensitive but
unclassified information by broadly interpreting existing FOIA exemptions).
7. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 214, 6 U.S.C. § 133.
8. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
9. See generally Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98
YALE L.J. 1385, 1400-04 (1989) (discussing America's evolution to a "perpetual state of
emergency" in the 20th century due to the changing character of warfare).
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validity of government exemption claims. Providing a tone of openness
and clearer guidelines for government officials responsible for secrecy
decisions may discourage overzealous classification. Second, Congress
should explicitly define the parameters of various exemptions in
legislation. Currently, the withholding of information is primarily
governed by executive order or a patchwork of statutes and regulations,
causing a lack of continuity and creating confusion. Precise legislative
definitions and standards would potentially limit some unwarranted
executive actions and provide greater clarity. Finally, Congress should
require in camera judicial review of documents withheld in the name of
national security. Too often judges deferentially review challenges to
executive withholding. Explicit congressional requirement of in camera
review would encourage judges to scrutinize more carefully officials'
claims and avoid potential separation of powers concerns.
I. NATIONAL SECURITY, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND FOIA
EXEMPTION I
A. Secrecy and Classified Information-Background and History
Classification of national security information (i.e., the determination
that certain government information relevant to national defense or foreign
relations should be available only to a few privileged officials) is a primary
mechanism of secrecy in government, especially as it relates to public
access to knowledge. Government secrecy is, of course, not limited to the
classification system. Government officials may, for example, maintain
secrecy regarding national security information by asserting executive
privilege in response to lawsuits or congressional requests for
information, or by closing certain administrative hearings, such as
immigration hearings."1 As the primary mechanism for controlling national
security information, however, the classification scheme is one of the
"pillars" of government secrecy and generally sets the tone regarding
secrecy.12 It is also the only mechanism of secrecy regarding national
security directly governed by FOJA. In discussing whether Congress
10. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 4-15, at 769-71 (3d ed.
2000) (explaining that presidential invocation of executive privilege in the name of military
or diplomatic objectives has existed since the presidency of George Washington).
11. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding
"newspapers did not have a First Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings that
were determined by the Attorney General to present significant national security concerns").
12. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PROTECTING AND REDUCING GOVERNMENT
SECRECY, S. Doc. No. 105-2, at 4 (1997) [hereinafter MOYNIHAN COMMISSION] (describing
the three pillars of government secrecy: secrecy with regard to the rules for classification
and physical security, personnel security rules and the principle of "need-to-know," and
sanctions for those who breach the commitment to maintain secrecy).
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should amend FOIA, this Article focuses on the classification system, its
relationship to other national security information, and its potential for
abuse.
The classification process within the United States has been and remains
governed almost entirely by executive order.' 3 Such orders typically define
the type of information that can be classified; the levels of classification;
who has classification authority; and the length of time material can be
classified. President Bush's current order, for example, states that
information can be classified only if it concerns:
(1) military plans, operations, and weapons systems,
(2) foreign government information,
(3) intelligence activities, sources or methods,
(4) foreign relations or foreign activities of the U.S.,
(5) scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national
security,
(6) government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials, and
weapons of mass destruction.14
It also prohibits government officials from classifying certain material,
such as basic scientific research.' 5  The order further provides that
information may be classified at three levels: (1) top secret; (2) secret; and
(3) confidential-terms that are defined as information "the unauthorized
disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause," respectively,
"exceptionally grave damage," "serious damage," or "damage," to national
security. 16
President Bush's order, like those of his predecessors, is the product of a
process that, although reasonably well entrenched, has significant
problems. Because the classification scheme is defined by executive order,
there is no legislative oversight, leaving executive officials with broad
discretion to determine the information to be classified, the duration of
classification, and other important details of the secrecy process. As
discussed below, executive officials have historically wielded this power
expansively, withholding information only remotely pertaining to national
security.
13. Occasionally, a statute provides classification criteria in limited circumstances. The
Atomic Energy Act, for example, provides legislative parameters with respect to
classification of information relating to nuclear weapons. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2161-2166, 2271-
2284 (2000). In general, however, most classifications are governed by executive order.
14. Exec. Order No. 13,292 § 1.4, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003).
15. Id. at § 1.7(b).
16. Id. at § 1.2. Among other things, Bush's order also limits the duration of
classification to either 10 or 25 years depending upon the sensitivity of the information,
although such terms can be extended, and provides for automatic declassification of certain
documents 25 years and older. Id. §§ 1.5, 3.3.
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Originally the classification system, a creation of the military
establishment, was narrowly limited to safeguarding military information.
17
With the advent of nuclear weapons and the Cold War, however,
government officials began to broadly interpret the concept of national
security. As the United States became a superpower, "[e]very challenge to
the United States hegemony anywhere in the world began to be perceived
as a threat to national security."'18 This broad notion of threat expanded our
defensive frontiers from protection against concrete, physical threats
against the country's borders to include potential threats to the country's
interests posed by worldwide events. Further, the term "national security"
came to implicate threats to "the entire resources of the nation-not only its
[military and] intelligence apparatus, but its scientific, industrial, and
economic capabilities."' 9
This wide-reaching notion of national security affected executive branch
classification of information. In 1951, President Truman's executive order
expanded government secrecy by extending the classification system to
include civilian agencies and allowed classification of all information "the
safeguarding of which is necessary in the interest of national security," a
category far broader than previous orders pertaining to "national
defense.,20  Although subsequent classification systems have varied
somewhat with administrations, 2 1 most have followed Truman's lead,
17. See Harold Relyea, The Presidency and the People's Right to Know, in THE
PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLICY 1, 12-20 (Harold Relyea et al. eds., 1981) (finding
that "[t]he first system for the protection of national defense documents and papers"
included "submarine mine projects and land defense plans); see also Williams S. Moorhead,
Operation and Reform of the Classification System in the United States, in SECRECY AND
FOREIGN POLICY 87, 94 (Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband eds., 1974) (emphasizing
that throughout the early period of classification procedures, such rules applied to
"safeguarding military secrets" and did not extend to non-military agencies).
18. Lobel, supra note 9, at 1400.
19. Note, National Security and the Amended Freedom of Information Act, 85 YALE
L.J. 401, 410 (1976) [hereinafter National Security and FOA].
20. See Exec, Order. No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 790 (1949-53); see also Quist, supra note 1,
at Ch. 3 (comparing Truman order with previous classification systems).
21. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, for example, attempted to narrow Truman's
order. See Quist, supra note 1, at Ch 3. Presidents Carter and Clinton also tried to rein in
secrecy while Presidents Nixon and Reagan and the current President Bush signed executive
orders vastly expanding the-government's ability to classify information. For discussions of
various administration's approaches to classification, see Relyea, supra note 17, at 24-26
(describing Carter's pledge of "maximum security declassification); Moorhead, supra note
17, at 102-05; Morton H. Halperin, The President and National Security Information, in
THE PRESIDENCY AND INFORMATION POLICY (Harold Relyea et al. eds., 1981), supra note 17,
at 68-69 (describing Carter's order and its affect on FOIA); and HERBERT N. FOERSTEL,
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW 51-57 (Greenwood Press 1999)
(discussing Reagan Executive Order 12,356 which "eliminated the need for government
agencies to consider the public's right to know when deciding whether to release
information").
1200 [56:4
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION AND FOIA
allowing classification by civilian agencies and relying on the amorphous
"national security" standard.22
Since the Truman era, most commentators agree that executive officials
have been too secretive regarding national security information. During the
1950s, several governmental commissions concluded that overclassification
was a problem.23 The Commission on Government Security, for example,
concluded that too many government employees were classifying
information in a manner that impeded scientific and technological research
and, consequently, actually posed a threat to national security.2 4
Investigators of excessive secrecy during the 1970s came to similar
conclusions, as testimony from government officials estimated that 90 to
99.5% of information in some departments was inappropriately classified.25
While problems with excessive secrecy improved somewhat during the
Clinton era,26 a 1997 commission found that some experts still estimated
that only 10% of classification actions involved "'legitimate protection of
secrets.',,
27
Most recently, the Bush administration appears to have embraced
secrecy regarding national security information. Classification of
information in the Bush administration increased fourteen percent from
22. Exec. Order No. 13,292 § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003) (Bush Order); Exec. Order
No. 12,958 § 1.1(a), 3 C.F.R. 334 (1995) (Clinton order); Exec. Order No. 12,356 § 1.1(a), 3
C.F.R. 167 (1982) (Reagan order); Exec. Order No. 12,065 § 1-1, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1978)
(Carter order); Exec. Order No. 11,652 § 1, 37 Fed Reg. 5209 (1972) (Nixon order).
President Eisenhower's order was a notable exception, allowing classification solely with
respect to "defense information." See Exec. Order No. 10,501 § 1(c), 3 C.F.R. 292 (1971).
23. See generally Availability of Information from Federal Departments and Agencies:
Hearings Before A House Subcommittee of the Committee of Government Operations, 84th
Cong. 85th Cong. (1956-58); REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT SECURITY
(1957) [hereinafter WRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT] (discussing overclassification problems
under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, identifying sources of overclassification, and
recommending changes to the classification system); see also, Moorhead, supra note 17, at
96 (discussing the Wright Commission and its recommendation to reduce the number of
government employees authorized to classify documents).
24. WRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 23, at 174-76.
25. US Government Information Policies and Practices-The Pentagon Papers:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. On Gov't Operations, 92d Cong., pt. 1,
12 (1971) (citing testimony of former U.N. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg estimating that
90% of the classified documents with which he had been involved were wrongly classified
or should have been declassified almost immediately); see also id. at 97 (citing statement of
William Florence, retired Air Force security analyst, to the effect that 99.5% of the
information within the defense department could be declassified without endangering
national security).
26. See Thomas S. Blanton, National Security and Open Government in the United
States: Beyond the Balancing Test, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT:
STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE 33, 52-54 (2003), at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/
opengov/NSOG.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004) (referring to President Clinton's "release of
more than forty million pages of secret documents" and "ordering sunsets and specific
justifications on each secret" a process which included "automatic declassification").
27. See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 36 (quoting National Security
Council Executive Secretary Rodney B. McDaniel).
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2001 to 2002.8 In 2003, Bush administration officials classified over 14
million documents, an increase of 14% over the previous year.29 A Bush
administration official has acknowledged that "up to half of what the
government now classifies needn't be.",30  This increase in classification
occurred while the Bush administration operated under President Clinton's
order. President Bush's new order, issued March 25, 2003, likely will
encourage even greater secrecy. Although the new order retains many
characteristics of the more liberal Clinton order, it encourages secrecy by
increasing the length of time material can be classified, lowering the
standard under which material can be exempted from declassification,
making it easier to reclassify material, and removing a Clinton era
presumption that when there exists doubt regarding the appropriateness of
classification, the issue should be resolved in favor of openness.3' Such
changes, while seemingly minor, promote greater secrecy by "changing the
'default' setting from 'do not classify' to 'classify.'
32
Given human nature, over-classification and the tilt toward secrecy is an
understandable phenomenon. All executive orders instruct classifiers to
gauge the type of threat information poses to national security when
determining whether and at what level to classify information. Given the
current understanding of the term "national security" as encompassing all
potential threats to United States interests, the classification process does
not involve identification of concrete threats but "is a prophylactic concept,
concerned with potential dangers-with 'intangibles, uncertainties and
probabilities."'' 33  In light of such uncertainty, executive officials have
every incentive to read a classification charge expansively. In fact,
psychological studies suggest that executives will err on the side of safety
when something as important as national security is at stake.34 This may be
28. INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE, 2002 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 6
(2003), at http://www.fas.org/sgp.isoo/2002rpt.pdf (last visited June 8, 2004).
29. See id at 18-20.
30. Christopher H. Schmitt & Edward T. Pound, Keeping Secrets, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Dec. 22, 2003, at 3 (statement of J. William Leonard, Director, Information Security
Oversight Office), available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/secrecy/22sec
recy_3.html (last visited June 2, 2004).
31. See Public Citizen, Analysis of Executive Order 13,292, 1-5, at http://www.bush-
secrecy.org/print~page.cfm?PagesID-31 (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (comparing the Bush and
Clinton orders).
32. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Assessing the New Normal: Liberty and
Security for the Post-September 11 United States 6 (2003), available at http://www.human-
rightsfirst.org/us-law/loss/assessing/assessingnewnormal.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004)
(explaining that the end result is the "classification of more documents, with attendant costs
for both government operations and public knowledge").
33. National Security and FOIA, supra note 19, at 411.
34. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 3 (Kahneman et
al. eds., 1982) (discussing the skewing effects involved when individuals engage in risk
assessment).
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true regardless of the classification scheme in place, but vesting the
executive with unfettered discretion to define the meaning of "national
security" and to set the tone regarding secrecy clearly exacerbates this
problem as executive officials, lacking accountability to independent
authorities, have no incentive to exercise diligence in their decisions.
Allowing the executive to change schemes at will causes further confusion
among lifetime bureaucrats, leaving them without guidance when making
difficult classification assessments.
In addition to encouraging simple errors in classification, the current
classification scheme facilitates over-classification arising from other
motives. Bureaucrats tend toward secrecy because it allows them to
maintain their power.35 History is rife with examples of executive officials
classifying information in order to avoid embarrassment, protect political
agendas, or hide affirmative government misconduct. Soon after World
War II, for example, the government secretly participated in the forced
repatriation of anti-communist Russians, refusing over 20 years later to
declassify its files on the subject.36  In the 1960s, executive officials
maintained secrecy regarding the government's policies in Vietnam 37 and
its war in Cambodia38 to facilitate public support and prevent revelations of
embarrassing failures. Similarly, the Nixon Administration hid its secret
support of Pakistan during the 1971 India-Pakistan War to avoid upsetting
the American public.39
The current administration has also been accused of classifying
information with these motives in mind. Members of the independent
commission examining the September 11 th terrorist attacks, for example,
have publicly expressed frustration with the administration's refusal to
35. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 233-34 (H.H. Gerth & C.
Wright Mills trans. 1958) ("Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the
professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.").
36. See House Debate and Vote, Mar. 14, reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES 249 (1974)
(discussing government's refusal to provide information on Operation Keelhaul)
[hereinafter SOURCE BOOK]; see also Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1970)
(providing a description of Operation Keelhaul).
37. Incidents and information initially kept secret but eventually coming to light
included the My Lai massacre, the authorization of bombing strikes on "off-limits" targets,
and the creation of the Pentagon Papers, a history of government decision-making regarding
the Vietnam War. Moorhead, supra note 17, at 89; see also Developments in the Law-The
National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1197-98 (1972)
("The publication of the top secret 'Pentagon Papers' has intensified the debate over the
proper role for secrecy in the conduct of defense and foreign affairs").
38. The Nixon administration publicly claimed that it had not bombed Cambodia
despite 14 months of air raids. It further falsified information to that effect in classified
reports to Congress. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 356-57 (1973).
39. The Nixon Administration publicly proclaimed neutrality but secretly supported
Pakistan. Id. at 357.
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share classified information with them, claiming that much of the material
reviewed was wrongly classified and that the administration was
withholding information for political reasons.4°  Some congressional
members participating in the congressional inquiry regarding September
1lth also claim that the administration classified portions of its report
regarding potential foreign government involvement with the September
l1th terrorists for political reasons.41  In light of recent revelations
regarding abuse of prisoners at the Abu Ghraib detention center in Iraq, and
the Bush Administration's torture memoranda, the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) recently accused the Bush administration of
unreasonably withholding information regarding torture of detainees in
response to FOIA requests last year.42 Finally, critics charge that the
administration has selectively declassified information supporting the war
in Iraq while keeping classified material that would have argued against the
war.
43
Such scandals attest to at least one of the costs of excessive secrecy-
lack of political accountability. Excessive secrecy also leads to poor
decision-making by insulating those responsible for decisions from
scrutiny, 44 ultimately impeding scientific and technological research by
40. See Philip Shenon, 9/11 Commission Could Subpoena Oval Office Files, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, available at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1026-
02.html (last visited June 10, 2004) (citing 9/11 commission member and former Sen. Max
Cleland's belief that the Bush Administration attempted to inhibit the Commission from
meeting its deadline); see also Lance Gay, 9/11 Panels Says Too Many Documents Stamped
Secret, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 15, 2004, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.
com/nationall173449_911 panelI5.html (last visited June 10, 2004) (highlighting vice-
chairman Lee Hamilton's comment that "[the commission has] a serious problem of
overclassification").
41. See 150 CONG. REC. S340-41 (daily ed. Feb. 2, 2004) (remarks of Sen. Graham)
("[T]he [Bush Administration] misused the classification process to protect the foreign
governments that may have been involved in 9-11."); see also Dana Priest & Susan
Schmidt, 9/11 Panel Criticizes Secrecy on Saudi Links, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2002, at A20,
available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/262818921.html (stating the Bush
Administration believed that declassifying the information would lead to potential
embarrassment and heightened political tensions). In response to congressional pressure,
the administration eventually declassified much of the report released to the public.
Douglas Jehl, Senate Iraq Report Said to Skirt White House Use of Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/08/politics/08inte.html (last
visited July 8, 2004).
42. See ACLU, U.S. Illegally Withheld Records on Abuses at Abu Ghraib and
Elsewhere (June 2, 2004), available at www.aclu.org/news/NewsPrint.cfm?ID=15885&c=
206 (last visited June 10, 2004). A federal district court eventually ordered the government
to produce or identify all documents responsive to the ACLU's request, noting that the
"glacial pace at which defendant agencies have been responding to plaintiffs' requests
shows an indifference to the commands of FOIA, and fails to afford accountability of
government that the act requires." ACLU v. Dep't of Defense, 2004 WL 2050921 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
43. See Dana Priest, A Clash on Classified Documents, WASH. POST, Mar. 31, 2004, at
A12.
44. See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 7 ("Secrecy has the potential to
undermine well-informed judgment by limiting the opportunity for input, review, and
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barring the sharing of information.45 Finally, it detracts from the purposes
of keeping information confidential by diluting the value of legitimately
secret information.46
B. Judicial Review of FOIA Exemption (b)(1) Claims
In 1966, Congress, recognizing problems with excessive secrecy,
enacted FOIA.47 The statute was designed to provide the public with a
legal right of access to government information, operating on a
presumption of "full agency disclosure unless information is exempted
under clearly delineated statutory language. 'A 8 The Act listed nine
exemptions upon which the government could rely in withholding
information but also provided de novo judicial review of all claims of
exemption.49  As in the current statute, the original statute provided an
exemption for national security, allowing withholding of information
"specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
the national defense or foreign policy." 50
Initially, lower courts deferred to executive invocation of the (b)(1)
exemption, allowing government officials to resist disclosure of
criticism, thus allowing individuals and groups to avoid the type of scrutiny that might
challenge long-accepted beliefs and ways of thinking."). Psychologists have noted this
phenomenon in government decisionmaking. See generally IRVING JANIS, GROUPTHINK:
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1982) (elaborating on the
Groupthink phenomenon found in government decision-making in times of crisis).
45. See MOYNIHAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 8 ("'[T]he classification of technical
information impedes its flow within our own system, and may easily do far more harm than
good by stifling critical discussion and review or by engendering frustration."') (quoting
Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Secrecy 9 (1970)); see also Executive
Privilege, Secrecy in Government, Freedom of Information, Hearings before the
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations of the Committee on Government Operations
and the Subcommittees on Separation of Powers and Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 302 (1973) (statement of Dr. Earl
Callen) ("Secrecy is inimical to science.") [hereinafter Executive Privilege Hearings].
46. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 729 (1971) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) ("[W]hen everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be manipulated by
those intent on self-protection or self-promotion.").
47. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 383. For history regarding
FOIA's enactment, see 1 JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE §§ 2.1-
2.3 (3d ed. 2000).
48. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). Congress was responding to problems with Section
3 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which allowed executive officials to withhold
information to protect "any function of the United States requiring secrecy in the public
interest." Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238. Congress believed this provision
to be inadequate because it precluded judicial review by allowing "any government
official... [to] withhold almost anything from any citizen under the vague standards or,
more precisely, lack of standards in section 3." Id. at 5.
49. The exemptions are codified in somewhat amended form at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)
(2000). The de novo review provision is currently codified at id § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000).
50. Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000)).
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information.5' Furthermore, in EPA v. Mink,52 the Supreme Court
interpreted the original (b)(1) exemption as allowing judges to review only
the procedural propriety of the classification and not whether a government
classification decision was substantively proper under the relevant
executive order. In 1974, Congress amended the (b)(1) exemption by
adding the requirement that national security information in fact be
"properly classified pursuant to ... Executive Order." 53 Congress further
provided courts with discretion to review documents in camera and to
require release of non-exempted portions of documents if reasonably
segregable.54 The conference report accompanying the amendments made
clear that Congress intended to overrule Mink and provide effective judicial
review of executive branch classification decisions.
While strengthening judicial review of the (b)(1) exemption, the
conference report also stated:
[T]he conferees recognize that the Executive departments responsible for
national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into
what adverse affects might occur as a result of public disclosure of a
particular classified record. Accordingly, the conferees expect that
Federal courts, in making de novo determinations in section 552(b)(1)
cases under the Freedom of Information law, will accord substantial
weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified
status of the disputed record.5
6
Apparently inserted as an attempt to appease President Ford, who
threatened to veto new provisions over separation of powers concerns, 57 the
conference statement sent mixed signals regarding courts roles in reviewing
(b)(1) exemptions. As a result, courts reviewing (b)(1) exemption
challenges still give great deference to executive classification decisions.
Most courts at least purport to exercise de novo review in accordance
with the 1974 amendments, generally adhering to the description set forth
in Ray v. Turner:
58
(1) The government has the burden of establishing an exemption.
(2) The court must make a de novo determination. (3) In doing
this, it must first accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit
concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed
51. See generally Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[W]hat is
desirable in the interest of national defense and foreign policy is not the sort of question that
courts are designed to deal with.").
52. 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973).
53. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (2000).
54. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
55. H. R. REP. No. 93-1380, at 11-12 (1974).
56. Id. at 12.
57. President Ford did veto the amendments, which Congress eventually overrode.
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 36, at 403-85.
58. 587 F.2d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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record. (4) Whether and how to conduct an in camera examination
of the documents rests in the sound discretion of the court, in
national security cases as in all other cases. [Finally, if]...
exemption is claimed on the basis of national security the District
Court must, of course, be satisfied that proper procedures have
been followed, and that by its sufficient description the contested
document logically falls into the category of the exemption
indicated. 9
The courts' interpretation of this standard, however, can vary dramatically.
Much of the difference comes about with respect to court treatment of
government affidavits supporting its claims of exemption. Typically, this
involves a description of the documents withheld, how they fall into a
particular category of classified information (e.g., military plans), a defense
of their categorization level (e.g., an explanation of how disclosure of
information "reasonably could be expected to damage national security" in
accordance with its designation as "confidential"), and a discussion
showing that proper procedures were followed.60
Some courts exercise reasonably aggressive review of such affidavits,
finding the government's submission inadequate unless it contains detailed
and particularized explanations of the classification decision and the
possible effects of disclosure.6 ' Most courts, however, rarely engage in
such review, instead holding that the government is entitled to summary
judgment if its affidavits describe the information withheld and the
justification for withholding it with reasonable specificity, the information
logically falls within the claimed exemptions, and there is no evidence on
the record to controvert the government's affidavits or show government
bad faith.62 Many of those courts make clear that if the government's
arguments are logical or plausible "the court is not to conduct a detailed
inquiry to decide whether it agrees with the agency's opinions; to do so
would violate the principle of affording substantial weight to the expert
59. Id. at 1194-95 (quoting Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
60. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (reviewing pertinent exemptions and
provisions for judicial review of determinations that particular information is subject to
exemption).
61. See, e.g, Wiener, v. FBI, 943 F.2d 972 (9th Cir. 1991); Goldberg v. U.S. Dep't of
State, 818 F.2d 71, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 1987); King v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210,
223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ; Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Ray v.
Turner, 587 F.2d 1187, 1196-97 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
62. See, e.g., Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Abbotts v. NRC, 766
F.2d 604, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Miller v. Casey, 730 F.2d 773, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Salisbury, v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d
1100, 1104-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Taylor v. Dep't of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 107, 109 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Lesar v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d, 472, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Baez v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,
647 F.2d 1328, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147-48 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Canning v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 848 F. Supp. 1037 (D.D.C. 1994).
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opinion of the agency. 63 Many further find that in camera review of the
government's documents is not only unnecessary but also inappropriate if
the government's affidavits meet the above conditions. 64
Most observers agree that courts are generally deferential to claims of
harm to national security, rarely overriding the government's classification
decisions.65 Although purporting to apply de novo review, they effectively
apply something less. Court cases involving the (b)(1) exemption decided
after the September 11 th terrorist attacks suggest that this deferential trend
will continue. Courts have refused to require disclosure of information
regarding the implementation of the USA Patriot Act 66 or the reasons
underlying one plaintiffs loss of her security clearance at the INS, noting
that "the court should not second-guess an agency's 'facially reasonable
concerns' regarding the harm disclosure may cause to national security. 67
Further, one court has deferred to national security concerns in reviewing a
(b)(7) exemption regarding law enforcement records, 68 despite the fact that
such deference is intended for (b)(1) exemptions only.6 9
II. SECRECY BEYOND CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND FOIA
Secrecy's creep is not manifested simply in expansive views regarding
classification. The government also has sought to keep information secret
in the name of national security even though it admittedly does not meet
classification standards. "Sensitive but classified" information and "critical
intrastructure" information fall into this category. Although government
63. Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148; see, e.g., Hayden v. Nat'l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv.,
608 F.2d 1381, 1384 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (applying principle of "substantial weight" and
deferring to agency expertise); Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1105 ("The test is not whether the court
personally agrees with the [agency's] evaluation of the danger-rather, the issue is
whether... the Agency's judgment objectively survives the test of reasonableness, good
faith, specificity and plausibility."); Canning, 848 F. Supp. at 1042 (noting that courts must
give "substantial weight" to agency affidavits in light of agency expertise in matters of
national defense and foreign policy).
64. See generally Hayden, 608 F.2d at 1387; Canning, 848 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
65. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLIAM T. MAYTON, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 17.4.1,
at 660-61 (2d ed. 2001); see also O'REILLY, supra note 47, § 11.26; Scott A. Faust, Note,
National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for Effective Judicial
Enforcement, 25 B.C. L. REV. 611, 629-36 (1984)
66. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
67. Coldiron v. Dep't of Justice, 310 F. Supp. 2d 44, 54 (D.D.C. 2004); ACLU v. Dep't
of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 29-30 (D.D.C 2003).
68. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 927 (D.C. Cir.
2003) ("[W]e have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the
national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review.").
69. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 315 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(clarifying the D.C. Circuit's reluctance to "extend any special deference beyond the
Exemption 1 context"); see also Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of State, 840 F.2d 26, 33-36
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (reviewing legislative history of exemptions). Some (b)(3) exemptions
also receive such deference in classification-related circumstances. See infra notes 93, 109-
10 and accompanying text.
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secrecy attempts regarding such information preceded September 1 1th,7°
the Bush Administration's aggressive actions since that date regarding both
"sensitive but unclassified" and "critical infrastructure" information
illustrate some of the problems associated with expanding secrecy and
FOLA.
A. "Sensitive But Unclassified" Information
The term "sensitive but unclassified" is difficult to characterize as both
its definition and purpose have evolved and been subject to inconsistent
agency usage. Congress first used the term "sensitive but unclassified" in
the Computer Security Act of 1987 (CSA).7 1 Designed to provide uniform
standards to protect the privacy and security of information in federal
government computers, the CSA defined the term "sensitive but
unclassified" as:
information, the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification
of which could adversely affect the national interest or the conduct of
Federal programs, or the privacy to which individuals are entitled under
[5 U.S.C. § 552a], but which has not been specifically authorized under
criteria established by an Executive order or Act of Congress to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.
72
CSA's purpose was not to prevent public disclosure of all "sensitive but
unclassified" information. Rather, Congress was concerned primarily with
unauthorized access or use of insecure computer databases by persons who
might use the information for fraudulent or abusive purposes. 73 As a result,
Congress made clear that:
the designation of information as sensitive under the Computer Security
Act is not a determination that the information is not subject to public
disclosure nor does such a designation bear on the determination to
disclose. Information that requires protection while it is being
70. See Genevieve J. Knezo, "Sensitive But Unclassified" and Other Federal Security
Controls on Scientific Information: History and Current Controversy 11 (2003), at
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31845.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2004) (finding that the
"sensitive but unclassified" term dates back a 1984 directive); see also John Moteff et al.,
Critical Infrastructures: What Makes an Infrastructure Critical? (2003), at http://www.fas.
org/irp/crs/RL31556.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (discussing Exec. Order No. 13,010
which defined the term "critical infrastructures").
71. Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724-30, (codified
at 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(d)(4)).
72. Id.
73. H.R. REP. No. 100-235, pt. 1, at 9-10 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3120,
3124-25. Furthermore, the CSA was a response to perceived overreaching by military and
intelligence officials who attempted to consolidate control over dissemination of non-
classified information. For a discussion of the government's actions leading to enactment of
the CSA, see H.R. REP. No. 100-235, at 9-29, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3157, 3161-
81; David Banisar, Stopping Science: The Case of Cryptography, 9 HEALTH MATRIX J. OF
L.-MED. 253, 255-62 (1999) (discussing various techniques employed by NSA in
suppressing the dissemination of information).
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transmitted over telecommunications facilities or while it is being stored
in a computer may nevertheless be public information under the Freedom
of Information Act .... 74
Over time, however, agencies have come to use the term "sensitive but
unclassified" in a different manner. Some agencies essentially use the
definition in the CSA while others use far broader definitions. The
Department of Energy, for example, expansively defines "sensitive but
unclassified" as: "[i]nformation for which disclosure, loss, misuse,
alteration or destruction could adversely affect national security or
government interests," defining the latter as including economic, human,
financial, industrial, agricultural, technological, law enforcement,
confidential, and commercial proprietary information.75 Others have
declared that "sensitive but unclassified" denotes all information exempt
under FOIA or the Privacy Act. 76  Most recently, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) defined such information to include
"information not otherwise categorized by statute or regulation, the
unauthorized disclosure of which could adversely impact a person's
privacy or welfare, the conduct of Federal programs, or other programs or
operations essential to the national interest.",77  Thus a patchwork of
definitions exists, ranging from those narrowly construing the term to those
including almost any matter in which the government is involved.
Second, the term "sensitive but unclassified" no longer simply delineates
information, the integrity of which must be protected from misuse while in
computer databases. Rather, agencies often use it to refer to any document
or electronic information that fits their definition.78 This change in context
also reflects a change in thinking regarding the need to protect information.
The "sensitive but unclassified" designation apparently no longer involves
safeguarding information while in the government's control. It now
designates information that is to be generally protected from disclosure.
The Department of State, for example, describes its use of the term as an
"'administrative control designation' to protect 'documents that do not
contain national security information but must be protected from
disclosure., 79 In short, despite its original definition and context, current
74. H.R. REP. No. 100-235 at 30, reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3182.
75. See Knezo, supra note 70, at 20-21 (quoting Department of Energy definition).
76. Id. at 16-17 (describing U.S. Department of State definition). The Privacy Act of
1974 is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
77. Department of Homeland Security, Safeguarding Sensitive But Unclassified (For
Official Use Only) Information § 4 (May 11, 2004) [hereinafter DHS Directive], at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/dhs-sbu.html (last visited June 18, 2004).
78. See U.S. Dep't of State, 12 FAM 540 Sensitive But Unclassified Information (1999)
[hereinafter 12 FAM 540], at http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/12fam/12m0540.pdf
(last visited June 15, 2004) (describing information "which warrants a degree of protection
and administrative control that meets the criteria for exemption from public disclosure").
79. U.S. Dep't of State, 5 FAH-1 H-130, Security Requirements 3 (July 1, 2002), at
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use of the term "sensitive but unclassified" involves a chaotic scheme of
varied, and sometimes conflicting, agency determinations that certain
information is to be protected from public disclosure.8°
Observers have noted that this treatment of "sensitive but unclassified"
information contributes to excessive secrecy by causing overclassification:
[T]here is little oversight of which information is designated as sensitive,
and virtually any agency employee can decide which information is to be
so regulated .... Moreover, the very lack of consistency from one
agency to another contributes to confusion about why this information is
to be protected and how it is to be handled. These designations
sometimes are mistaken for a fourth classification level, causing
unclassified information with these markings to be treated like classified
information.
8 1
Such classification errors are likely to go uncorrected. As discussed
above, executive officials have little incentive to risk administrative
penalties imposed for unauthorized disclosure (of which there are often
many pertaining to "sensitive but unclassified" information).82 Thus,
classification is the easiest and safest route. Furthermore, courts are
unlikely to rectify this problem as they frequently defer to government
claims regarding the (b)(1) exemption, the context in which claims of
overclassification are raised.
Recent Bush Administration actions will likely exacerbate problems of
excessive secrecy regarding "sensitive but unclassified" information. In
March 2002, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card issued a
memorandum directing agencies to safeguard government information
"regarding weapons of mass destruction, as well as other information that
could be misused to harm the security of our Nation and the safety of our
people. 83  A supplemental memorandum written by Laura Kimberly,
Acting Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, provided
guidance for implementing the Card memorandum, noting that in
http://www.foia.state.gov/masterdocs/05fah01/CHO130.pdf (last visited June 15, 2004);
Joint Security Commission, Redefining Security: A Report to the Secretary of Defense and
the Director of Central Intelligence, Chapter 2-Classification Management 33 (1994)
[hereinafter Joint Security Commission Report], at http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/jsc/chap-
2.html ("Unclassified information is further subdivided into sensitive information-
unclassified information which has some confidentiality requirement-and non-sensitive
information which may be disseminated freely.") (last visited June 16, 2004).
80. Knezo, supra note 70, at 10; James J. Bagley, Understanding Controls on
Unclassified Government Information (1993), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/
bagley.html (last visited Apr. 29, 2004).
81. MOYNIIAN COMMISSION, supra note 12, at 29.
82. See generally 12 FAM 540, supra note 78, at 2 ("Unauthorized disclosure of SBU
information may result in criminal and/or civil penalties."); DHS Directive, supra note 77,
at § 5 (referring to possible administrative and disciplinary action for unauthorized
disclosure).
83. Card Memorandum, supra note 6.
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safeguarding "sensitive but unclassified" information, agencies should give
"full and careful consideration to all applicable FOIA exemptions" in
accordance with an earlier Ashcroft directive encouraging agency officials
aggressively to interpret FOIA in favor of withholding information.84
The Bush Administration's actions will encourage excessive secrecy in
many ways. Most obviously, the Card and Kimberly memorandums
solidify the apparent understanding of the term "sensitive but unclassified"
as a designation associated with disclosure issues. Agency personnel
operating with this background understanding may be emboldened to freely
use the "sensitive but unclassified" designation to justify withholding of
information. Furthermore, the Card and Kimberly memoranda encourage
such withholding without providing agency personnel with a usable
definition of "sensitive but unclassified" information.85 The only guidance
with respect to the information covered is the Card memorandum's
reference to "[g]overnment information regarding weapons of mass
destruction, as well as other information that could be misused to harm the
security of our nation [or threaten public safety]. 86  That definition,
however, is so broad as to be useless in terms of providing clear guidelines
capable of reining in overzealous officials. Rather, that language merely
sets a tone encouraging government officials to use their widely varied
"sensitive but unclassified" definitions to withhold information under the
FOJA. With some government officials estimating that nearly 75 percent
of all government-held information is "sensitive but unclassified,, 87 the
effect of such an approach could be substantial.
Courts could, of course, temper abuse of the "sensitive but unclassified"
designation by finding that withheld documents do not fall within an
existing FOIA exemption. As long as "sensitive but unclassified"
withholdings are made in the name of national security, however, there
remains a distinct possibility that courts will defer to the government
claims and allow information to be withheld even if actually unrelated to
national security concerns.
88
84. See Kimberly Memorandum, supra note 6. Specifically, the Kimberly
memorandum urged agencies to apply aggressively FOIA's (b)(2) and b(4) exemptions
regarding, respectively, "internal personnel rules and practices of an agency" and personal
and confidential "trade secrets and commercial or financial information." Id. (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(2), (b)(4) (2000)).
85. The OMB is working on a guidance regarding "sensitive but unclassified"
information but has yet to issue it. Knezo, supra note 70, at 37.
86. Card Memorandum, supra note 6.
87. Joint Security Commission Report, supra note 79, at 33.
88. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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B. The Critical Infrastructure Exemption
Just as national security came to be defined more broadly after World
War II, in recent years the government also broadened the spectrum of
American society responsible for protecting national security. In 1997, the
President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection noted that the
nation's infrastructure (e.g., energy, banking and finance,
telecommunications, transportation, vital human services) was at risk from
various threats.89 Noting much of this infrastructure is privately owned, the
report concluded that "national defense is no longer the exclusive preserve
of government, and economic security is no longer just about business.
[Critical infrastructure is] central to our national defense and our economic
power, and we must lay the foundations for [its] future security on ...
cooperation between government and the private sector." 90
As part of that cooperation, the commission found that increased
information sharing between government and private entities was an
immediate need.91  It further noted that, because private industry was
reluctant to share information due to liability concerns and fear of losing
competitive advantage, Congress should consider enacting a FOIA
exemption protecting the shared material as an incentive for information
exchange.92 Such protection would be tantamount to giving the same kind
of confidentiality status to private information that classified status gives to
government-held information regarding national security.
93
At the time, Congress did not enact such an exemption. 94  After the
September 11 th terrorist attacks, however, the Bush Administration lobbied
for and received a FOIA exemption in the Homeland Security Act of 2002.
The Act allows the DHS to withhold "critical infrastructure information...
that is voluntarily submitted" to it by private entities "regarding the security
of critical infrastructure and protected systems. 95
The Act defines critical infrastructure as physical or virtual systems "so
vital to the United States that [their] incapacity or destruction would have a
89. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, CRITICAL
FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES ix (1997) [hereinafter CRITICAL
FOUNDATIONS].
90. Id.
91. Id. at 21.
92. Id. at 27, 31.
93. See O'REILLY, supra note 47, § 13.14 (noting that an exemption for critical
infrastructure information created an 'almost-classified category').
94. Congress did enact a narrow exemption to facilitate information sharing regarding
Y2K computer problems. See Year 2000 Information Readiness and Disclosure Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-271, 112 Stat. 2386 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)).
95. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2135,
2152 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1) (2000)). The exemption is a FOIA (b)(3)
exemption, which allows the government to withhold information "specifically exempted
from disclosure by statute." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
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debilitating impact on security, national economic security, [or] national
public health or safety. 96  It further defines "critical infrastructure
information" as information "not customarily in the public domain [that is]
related to the security of critical infrastructure or protected systems,"
including information regarding (1) actual or potential interference via
physical or computer-based attack, or other similar conduct that violates
law or threatens interstate commerce or public safety; (2) any planned or
past assessment, projection, or estimate of vulnerability to interference,
including security testing, risk evaluation, risk management planning, or
risk audit; or (3) any planned or past operational problem or solution,
including repair, recovery, reconstruction, insurance, or continuity related
to interference.97 In addition to providing a FOIA exemption, the Act
imposes criminal penalties for unauthorized disclosure of information,
provides companies with immunity from civil liability based on such
information, and preempts state access laws. 98  As with the 1997
commission, those favoring the FOIA exemption argue that it was
necessary to ensure adequate information-sharing critical to protecting the
nation's security. 99
While information-sharing regarding potentially vulnerable targets is a
laudable goal, especially in light of the government's past lapses,100 the
new FOIA exemption suffers from significant problems likely to cause
excessive secrecy regarding information only tangentially related to
national security. The Act's definition of "critical infrastructure" never
identifies which systems or industries are critical to the safety of the nation,
instead leaving it to the DHS to identify such systems. Further, there is no
commonly accepted understanding of the term, with some viewing the
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). The Homeland Security Act incorporates this definition from
the earlier-enacted USA Patriot Act. See 6 U.S.C. § 10 1(4) (2000).
97. 6 U.S.C. § 131(3) (2002).
98. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, § 214(), 6 U.S.C. § 133(f) (criminal
penalties); see also id. at § 214(a)(1)(C), 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(C) (civil "use" immunity);
see also id. at § 214(a)(1)(E), 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(E) (preemption of state access laws).
99. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS 26 (2003); see also Homeland Security: The
Federal and New York Response, Field Hearing Before the House Comm. on Science, 107th
Cong. 26-33 (2002) (statement of James K. Kallstrom, Special Advisor to Governor Pataki
on Counter-Terrorism) (arguing that "outdated public disclosure laws" hindered the
government's ability to collect information necessary to protect critical infrastructures); see
also Creating the Department of Homeland Security: Consideration of the Administration 's
Proposal-Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigation of the House
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong. 226 (2002) (statement of Guy Copeland, Vice
President, Computer Sciences Corporation) (endorsing the exemption as a way to improve
information sharing and allay industry fears regarding disclosure under FOIA).
100. See Final Report Slams FBI, CIA, USA TODAY, June 9, 2004, available at
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-06-09-91 lreportx.htm?POE=NEWISVA
(last visited June 16, 2004) (recounting problems with intelligence sharing leading up to the
September 11 th terrorist attacks).
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issue of critical infrastructure as primarily a cyber systems problem, 01 and
others extending the definition to include national monuments, the
destruction of which might hurt the nation's morale.' 0 2  This lack of
guidance is exacerbated by the definition of "protected systems" included
within the Act's definition of "critical infrastructure," which encompasses
"any service, physical or computer-based system, process, or procedure
that directly or indirectly affects the viability of a facility of critical
infrastructure."' 0 3  The potential breadth of the DHS's definition is
staggering. The broad discretion left with the agency is akin to that given
the President to identify classified information, suggesting that the "critical
infrastructure" exemption could be subject to the same kinds of abuses.
That there are criminal penalties attached to disclosure of such information
further exacerbates this problem as agency officials have skewed incentives
to interpret the exemption broadly to protect themselves.
10 4
Further compounding this potential for abuse are other vague definitions.
"Critical infrastructure information" for example, is not limited to
vulnerabilities regarding such systems but may include repairs, even for
routine reasons, to anything qualifying as critical infrastructure.1
0 5
Similarly, the term "voluntarily submitted" includes information submitted
"in the absence of [an] agency's exercise of legal authority to compel
access to or submission of such information."'' 0 6 It is unclear whether that
101. The 1997 commission identified transportation, oil and gas production and storage,
water supply, emergency services, banking and finance, electrical power, and
telecommunications as critical infrastructure. See CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 89, at
3-4. However, though discussing physical assets, it clearly focused on cyber security
regarding those assets as the primary vulnerability. Id. at 11, 15-19. See also Rena
Steinzor, "Democracies Die Behind Closed Doors ": The Homeland Security Act and
Corporate Accountability, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 641, 642-43 (2003) (stating that
possible cyberspace terrorist attacks resulted in proposed legislation authorizing secret
consultations).
102. Moteff et al., supra note 70, at 7.
103. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214(a)(1), 116 Stat. 2135,
2152 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 131(6) (2000)) (emphasis added).
104. See Kristen Elizabeth Uhl, Comment, The Freedom of Information Act Post-9/li:
Balancing the Public's Right to Know, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Homeland
Security, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 261, 295 (2003) (intimating that criminal penalties are
inconsistent with FOIA's attempt to limit nondisclosure of national security information
under FOIA); see also John D. Moteff & Gina Marie Stevens, Critical Infrastructure
Information Disclosure and Homeland Security 18 (2003), at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/RL
31547.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) (recounting public interest groups' view of the
provision providing criminal penalties as an "anti-whistleblower provision"); see also 148
CONG. REc. S 11425 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (arguing that the
criminal penalties will "make it much easier" for companies to escape responsibility when
they violate the law).
105. For a more thorough discussion, see Steinzor, supra note 101, at 646-47.
106. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 131(7)(A), 116. Stat. 2135
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 101). There exist exceptions for certain SEC submissions and




definition means that information is voluntarily submitted if the agency has
no legal authority to mandate submission or simply that the agency has not
exercised its legal authority. If the latter, the exemption's breadth expands
dramatically.
Commentators argue that the exemption's breadth reveals that it is less
about national security than it is about protecting business interests.
Inasmuch as executive officials have used the classification system to hide
embarrassing and illegal activity, commentators fear businesses will use the
critical infrastructure exemption to do essentially the same. '0 7 To support
their qualms, they note that the Bush Administration's original proposal
contained a narrower exemption for information pertaining to infrastructure
"vulnerabilities" but that the language subsequently expanded, suggesting
that industry lobbying, rather than national security, was the driving
issue.1°8 They further argue that the civil immunity provision provides
industry a strong incentive to interpret the term "critical infrastructure
information" broadly in order to hide information.10 9 Finally, they argue
that the new exemption is unnecessary as current FOIA exemptions-the
(b)(2) exemption for agency personnel rules and practices and the (b)(4)
exemption for confidential business records-provide the core protections
that industry seeks; the new exemption simply encourages abuse.I 0
Overall, the critical infrastructure exemption from FOIA is subject to
many of the abuses of secrecy that have run rampant in the national
security context. As in other instances, it is unclear whether courts will
check these abuses. The "critical infrastructure" exemption is a (b)(3)
exemption (i.e., material specifically exempted by statute). Courts have
applied (b)(1) deference to (b)(3) exemptions in situations where the
information in question relates to national security in essentially the same
way as classified information."' Because the critical infrastructure
exemption is linked closely to "national security" concerns, there is reason
to believe that courts will defer to government claims of exemption.
Furthermore, to the extent that material withheld under the critical
infrastructure exemption overlaps with the (b)(4) exemption on confidential
107. Steinzor, supra note 101, at 646-47; see also Uhl, supra note 104, at 294; H.R. REP.
No. 107-609, 107th Cong., 220 (2002) (minority report).
108. 148 CONG. REC. Si 1425 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy);
Steinzor, supra note 101, at 659.
109. 148 CONG. REc. S 11425 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 2002) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
110. Id. at S11423-4 (statement of Sen. Leahy); see also Stephen Gidiere & Jason
Forrester, Balancing Homeland Security and Freedom of Information, 16 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV'T 139 (2002). Interestingly, the Kimberly memorandum specifically referenced these
two provisions as ways to safeguard critical infrastructure information suggesting that the
Bush administration was aware of adequate existing protections prior to lobbying for a new
exemption. See Kimberly Memorandum, supra note 6 (detailing FOIA procedures).
111. See generally Ray v. Turner 587 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Halperin v.
CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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business records, courts already defer to certain claims under that
exemption. 1 2 Reading it in light of national security concerns suggests that
courts will be just as, if not more, deferential to the critical infrastructure
exemption.
III. POTENTIAL FOIA AMENDMENTS RELATED TO NATIONAL SECURITY
INFORMATION
All of the information discussed above relates, in one form or another, to
national security. In light of the executive branch's natural tendency
toward secrecy in the national security context, and the unfettered
discretion executive officials enjoy under the current regime, it is unlikely
that the problems attendant to secrecy will improve absent congressional
amendment of FOIA (directly or indirectly).' 13 There are many possible
approaches, all of which would involve significant study.' 14 It is not the
purpose of this Article to detail specific legislation. Rather, this section
suggests three aspects of legislation necessary to ensure that FOIA's
purposes are served while still protecting national security.
First, Congress should establish a single, overarching, statutory
framework governing classified, sensitive but classified, and critical
infrastructure information." 5  Such legislation can define terms, set
standards for keeping information secret, determine the scope of the
redefined FOIA exemption, and set forth terms of judicial review. Such an
112. Critical Mass Energy Project, v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
113. See FOERSTEL, supra note 21, at 181 ("Only a fundamental change in the way
information is classified can break the logjam [associated with secrecy], and the best
possibility for reform rests with the [legislature]."). Such legislation may be direct in that
all changes could be found in amendments to the language of exemption (b)(1). Or it may
be indirect in that the (b)(1) exemption could reference a different statute that sets out most
of the parameters discussed here.
114. Over the years, people have proposed a wide variety of legislation codifying
guidelines to executive classification authority and withholding of information under FOIA.
For a discussion of such proposals, see FOERSTEL, supra note 21, at 181-84 (describing Sen.
Patrick Moynihan's proposed "Government Secrecy Act of 1987"); Faust, supra note 65, at
641 (proposing an amendment to FOIA exemption 1); National Security and FOIA, supra
note 19, at 421-22 (proposing that Congress legislate the substantive areas in which
government information can be classified); Moorhead, supra note 17, at 108-11 (proposing
creation of an independent "Classification Review Commission" with authority over the
classification system); and Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 45, at 293-98; id. at
312 (proposing "National Defense Data Classification Act of 1973").
115. There are laws regarding FOIA exemptions of national security information beyond
the three situations this Article discusses. For example, the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act, 49 U.S.C. § 114 (Supp. 1 2001), prohibits disclosure of sensitive transportation
information and the CIA Information Act, 50 U.S.C. § 431 (2000) exempts CIA operational
files from disclosure. This Article focuses on the three examples discussed herein because
they withhold information based on general notions of national security. In contrast, the
CIA and transportation security laws aim at specific contexts and agencies. That difference
may or may not argue for separate treatment. One could quite possibly extend this Article's
framework to cover such situations. The point of this Article is to propose a framework that
at a minimum brings together all general exemptions based on national security.
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approach has significant advantages over the existing regime, which is
currently a patchwork of definitions and standards from various (sometimes
questionable) sources that lacks cohesiveness.' 16
This framework would require Congress to review all national security
information to determine (1) how current categorizations relate to one
another, (2) whether secrecy with respect to each area is necessary, and
(3) the relationship between judicial review and the executive claims of
exemption. By reviewing and presenting the information as one body of
work rather than in piecemeal fashion, Congress can better understand the
body of knowledge currently being kept secret and act accordingly. In
addition, codifying secrecy standards and FOIA exemptions together
provides a continuity that is clearly missing from the current approach
where changes in administration can effect drastic changes to information
withholding.' ' 7  Such continuity provides greater clarity for bureaucrats
making secrecy decisions and, ideally, will improve those decisions.
Finally, an overarching statute will set a tone of openness that can permeate
all withholding-related decisions, either through explicit statements or the
general framework of standards prescribed. 18 Currently, FOIA purports to
set such a tone but all other official pronouncements regarding national
security information emphasize the need for secrecy. By promoting
openness in this framework statute, Congress could establish an important
default setting against which executive officials work." 9
Second, the statute must, at a minimum, provide precise definitions and
116. Given the Supreme Court's deference to executive decision-making in national
security situations, see, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936)
(explaining basis of federal power dealing with foreign affairs), some people will raise
separation of powers arguments against the proposed statute. The Supreme Court has also
indicated, however, that Congress can establish guidelines regarding the executive's power
to keep information secret. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 83 (1973) ("Congress could
certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new procedures [regarding
classification] or it could have established its own procedures-subject only to whatever
limitations the Executive privilege may be held to impose upon such congressional
ordering."). While the separation of powers argument must be recognized during the
crafting of legislation, it does not appear to prevent Congress from acting in this area.
117. See, e.g., Moorhead, supra note 17, at 102-05 (discussing criticism of Nixon order
on classification); Note, Keeping Secrets: Congress, the Courts, and National Security
Information, 103 HARV. L. REv. 906, 909-10 (1990) (discussing Reagan order).
118. President Carter's executive order did this to some extent by requiring disclosure of
even properly classified information unless that information could "reasonably be expected
to cause identifiable harm to national security' and 'when the need to protect information
outweigh[ed] the public interest in disclosure."' See Exec. Order No. 12065, 3 C.F.R. 191
(1978). Congress could enact a similar provision. See Faust, supra note 65, at 641
(discussing proposed legislation with such a requirement).
119. Such changes promote the openness and accountability necessary to democracy. In
this sense, the legislation operates as a "framework statute" as described by Bruce
Ackerman. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 1077-
78 (2004) (discussing APA as a framework statute that "sought to impose constitutional
order on new and unruly realities" and which "imposed fundamental constraints on
bureaucratic government in the name of democracy and the rule of law").
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standards for keeping information secret.120 With respect to definitions of
information to be withheld, Congress should consider limiting secrecy to
information related to "national defense" as opposed to the more
amorphous notion of "national security."' 12 1 It is possible that the current
entrenched notion of national security may render such a narrowing
construction impossible (although the debate itself should prove
worthwhile).122 In any case, Congress must establish precise definitions of
the categories of information to be withheld. The Clinton and Bush orders
provide reasonably good examples of such categorization. Even here,
however, vague categories such as "scientific, technological, or economic
matters related to" national security still exist and Congress should revisit
them to determine if they can be narrowed. 123  Precise definitions are
especially important with respect to "sensitive but unclassified"'
124
information, which currently has no single definition and "critical
infrastructure information" which is defined so broadly as to allow
withholding of almost anything.
25
Congress should also precisely define classification standards. Current
standards allow classification if information reasonably could be expected
to cause "exceptionally grave damage," "serious damage," or "damage," to
national security. Sensitive but unclassified information is usually kept
confidential if it "adversely affects" certain national interests. Critical
120. See William G. Phillips, The Government's Classification System, in NONE OF
YOUR BUSINESS: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN AMERICA 61, 80-82 (Norman Dorsen & Stephen
Gillers eds., 1974). Phillips suggests several other criteria that should be subject to
legislation, such as the length of classification, declassification requirements, and
mechanisms for internal review. Obviously, all such details are important. It is not clear,
however, that they must be contained in legislation or whether Congress, after providing
guidelines, could delegate specifics to an administrative entity such as an independent
commission. See, e.g., President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992, Pub. L. No. 102-526, 106 Stat. 3443 (1992) (establishing commission to oversee
declassification of Kennedy assassination records). Definitions and standards regarding
information to be withheld are too central to the abuse of secrecy for Congress to delegate.
121. See Executive Privilege Hearings, supra note 45, at 293-98 (citing proposal of
William J. Florence).
122. Congress could limit classification to information necessary to protect specific
foreign policy or national security objectives. National Security and FOIA, supra note 19,
at 421-22. Such a limitation may curb the tendency to classify everything related to a
category even when information does not pose a threat.
123. See generally Exec. Order. No. 13,292 § 1.4, 3 C.F.R. 198 (2003) (Bush order).
124. This assumes that Congress will use the "sensitive but unclassified" term in the
disclosure context. One can make a strong argument that Congress should not use the term
as it merely confuses issues regarding classification. If information poses a danger, it
should be classified. If it does not, it should be subject to disclosure.
125. Senators Leahy, Levin, Jeffords, Lieberman, and Byrd proposed a bill limiting the
critical infrastructure exemption to information regarding "the vulnerability of and threats to
critical infrastructure (such as attacks, response and recovery efforts)," which provides a
workable approach to narrowing the definition. See 149 CONG. REC. S3631-39 (daily ed.
Mar. 12, 2003). The bill also remedies many of the defects in the current exemption
discussed above. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
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infrastructure information is exempt from disclosure because it has a
"debilitating impact on security, national economic security, [or] national
public health or safety." All of these standards vary greatly. None of them
provides much guidance. Congress should create a uniform standard(s)
governing national security information. Such a standard might require, for
example, that information can be classified when there are specific and
articulable facts suggesting that disclosure of such information would cause
identifiable harm to national security or critical infrastructure and that harm
outweighs the public interest in disclosure. That standard provides
coherence and guidance by requiring executive officials to focus on
specific facts and weigh the harm against the need for public disclosure and
may prevent overly broad classification of even non-threatening
information simply because it is related to a category.
26
Finally, Congress must encourage less deferential review regarding
government claims of exemption under FOIA. It is not feasible for
Congress to legislate stricter standards of review given that judges are
supposed to review such claims de novo. Thus, Congress is left to change
the accoutrements of de novo review. Most importantly, Congress should
require in camera inspection of documents in national security cases rather
than leaving it to judicial discretion, which many courts refuse to exercise.
Such inspection would provide judges information that is often lacking in
affidavits. As a result, judges might be more willing to question and
overturn officials' claims. Furthermore, the fact that Congress has firmly
indicated its desire for more aggressive review of government claims may
assuage judicial reticence in this area.127 Ultimately, the prospect of real
scrutiny and the requirement of specific justifications as opposed to
boilerplate recitations, may generally improve executive decisionmaking in
this area.12
8
126. See Thomas Blanton, The World's Right to Know, FOREIGN POL'Y, Aug. 2002, at 50
(noting that nuclear weapons design and policies regarding nuclear weapons usage pose
different threats to national security and that need for secrecy regarding the former might
outweigh the public interest in disclosure while secrecy regarding the latter may not).
127. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and
Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach To Rights During Wartime, 5
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 1 (2004) (discussing relationship between courts, executive
branch and Congress in national security issues).
128. Scott Armstrong, The War Over Secrecy: Democracy's Most Important Low-
Intensity Conflict, in A CULTURE OF SECRECY: THE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE PEOPLE'S
RIGHT TO KNOW 140, 172 (Athan G. Theoharis ed., 1998). Psychologists have observed that
decision-making improves as a result of perceived scrutiny from others, a phenomenon
termed "accountability." Jennifer S. Lemer & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects
of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999). For an argument that judicial review
can serve as a mechanism for executive accountability, see Christina E. Wells, Questioning
Deference, 69 Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004).
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CONCLUSION
Excessive secrecy is and has been a genuine problem in the United
States and is likely to worsen as threats of terrorism indefinitely continue.
So strong is the pull of secrecy that one can plausibly argue the futility of
statutory schemes and judicial review. After all, executive officials control
this information in the first place and hold the upper hand in responding to
requests. If they do not wish to disclose information, they can find ways to
withhold it, regardless of whether it is properly classified., 29 Excessive
secrecy may thus be inevitable.
Surely, there is some truth to this argument. But declining to set
legislative standards based upon it is a mistake. Legal mechanisms such as
statutory requirements and judicial review are part of the overall backdrop
against which officials make decisions to withhold information. Although
such mechanisms provide no guarantee, without a strong presumption
against secrecy, overzealous officials will inevitably withhold too much.
30
Congressional standards thus send an important signal to resist the
inevitable pull toward secrecy that threatens to engulf democratic notions
of government premised upon openness and accountability. Such
standards, even if "unlikely to be followed still may have some effect, in
the long run, on what is or is not inevitable."'
31
129. See Stanley Futterman, What Is the Problem with Classification?, in NONE OF YOUR
BusINEss, supra note 120, at 93, 95 ("An unclassified document can be hidden just as
deeply in a file drawer.., as a classified document can."); see also Laura Gordon-Mumane,
Access to Government Information in a Post 9/11 World, SEARCHER, June 2002, at 50
(recounting government official's assessment that much withholding is driven by attitudes
of officials rather than legal requirements).
130. SISSELA BOK, SECRETS 181 (1982) ("[A] strong presumption against government
control over secrecy" is necessary in order to escape "piecemeal dismantling" of FOIA).
131. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1075, 1085 n.ll (1985).
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